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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin steps forward, Medvedev shrinks back 
A recent Russian State Council meeting has attracted a great deal of attention, 
primarily for the “surprise” appearance of Prime Minister Putin at the meeting and 
for his decision to participate, thereby wresting control of the “political 
modernization” project from Medvedev.  The State Council meeting had been 
intended as part of an ongoing discussion of reform for Russia’s political system, 
a project initiated in the late summer by President Medvedev with a manifesto on 
Russia’s development and later spurred along by protests over fraudulent 
regional elections.  During his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 
November 2009, Medvedev repeated his criticisms of Russia’s political 
development and expanded his hallmark concept of modernization to embrace 
the need to reform Russia’s system of governance. 
 
Medvedev invited the leaders of Russia’s regions and of its political parties to 
gather in the State Council forum to hear, evaluate, and discuss a report on 
political reform compiled by a special commission headed by State Council 
member and Kaliningrad Oblast’ Governor Georgy Boos.   According to the 
publication Vedomosti, it was not known in the Kremlin that Putin would attend 
until the week of the event, and his decision to address the group “only became 
known the morning of meeting day.” (1)  If Medvedev held any illusions that his 
position as president gave him supreme authority in Russia, it seems likely they 
were dashed when his carefully crafted forum for modernization turned into 
another plain-talking Putin spectacle that put intellectualizing over political 
reforms on the back burner, along with any tetchy concerns over electoral fraud. 
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As Putin explained in response to comments on the apparent electoral fraud in 
last fall’s regional elections and anecdotes describing electoral abuses from the 
internet:  “Half of what is displayed on the internet is porno!  Why quote the 
internet?  If you have evidence, take it to court.” (2)  For those wondering, Putin’s 
very next comments referred to reforms to “consolidate the judicial system.” (3) 
 
Medvedev, who has had long experience working with Putin, may only have had 
a few hours to recalibrate his remarks, but managed to find a calm, mid-range to 
express his thoughts, perhaps as much on the tandem as on the system as a 
whole: “I have spoken on many past occasions and say that we have a political 
system that works. It is far from ideal, but it does work.” (4)  Despite the promise 
inherent in the publication of his Manifesto and calls for a discussion of Russia’s 
political, economic, and social deficits, Medvedev seems hesitant in moving 
beyond his tepid rhetoric.  Putin’s appearance and tone at the State Council 
meeting seemed to have the effect of drawing a line under the political 
modernization debate: end of discussion. 
 
Of course, the policy or pace of political modernization is not the point of this 
political drama.  At its core is the attempt by Medvedev to distance or distinguish 
himself from Putin and developments associated with his presidency.  The 
current prime minister, however, could not allow a forum critical of the political 
system that developed during his presidency to discredit or marginalize him.  
Unless, that is, he no longer harbored political ambitions.  Putin aptly dispelled 
any doubts on that score this week. 
 
It is safe to assume that Medvedev understood this message from his tandem 
“blood brother” as well.  What remains to be seen is whether or not Medvedev’s 
ambitions will motivate him to challenge Putin for the next presidential term.  If 
so, judicial reform and corruption investigations may yet serve as conduits for 
proxy apparat clan attacks as Medvedev and Putin position themselves for the 
decision in 2012.  
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The 2012 presidential election, of course, now seems even less likely to be the 
actual forum for selecting the next Russian president.  As Putin noted in 
September, “When it comes to 2012, we'll work it out together, taking into 
account the current reality, our own plans, the shape of the political landscape, 
and the state of United Russia, the ruling party.” (5)  
 
Putin’s appearance at the State Council and its effect on the modernization 
debate also made clear that the “decision” in 2012 really would be made by only 
one man. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Advocate,” by Natalia Kostenko, Vedomosti, 25 Jan 10; What the Papers 
Say (Agency WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) “Prime Minister Putin defends the political process at a meeting of the State 
Council,” 22 Jan 10, Working Day section of the website of the prime minster of 
the Russian Federation via http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/9065/. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Speech at State Council Meeting on Developing Russia’s Political System, 
President Dmitri Medvedev, Russian Presidential web portal, 22 Jan 10 via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/01/22/2000_type82913_223914.shtml. 
(5) “Putin hints at presidential bid,” by Bridget Kendall, BBC World News, 11 Sep 
09, 23:02 GMT via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8251856.stm. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
Jury trials in modern Russia 
On January 1, 2010, jury trials were introduced in Chechnya, the only federal 
Russian region that did not have this institution. This was the final step in the jury 
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reform process that began in 1993-94, when pilot juries were implemented in 
nine federal regions before the system expanded to other regions. Jury trials 
were first implemented in Russia in 1864 and abolished by the Bolshevik 
government in 1922. (1) 
 
The current Russian jury model is a peculiar hybrid of pre-revolutionary Russian, 
Soviet, and Western criminal procedures. Its distinctive elements are: the lack of 
jurisdiction over crimes against the state; the absence of the unanimity 
requirement; a three-hour maximum deliberation period; the option to remand a 
case back to the prosecution for additional investigation; and the Supreme 
Court’s right to overturn a verdict (Russian criminal law does not prohibit double 
jeopardy). Juries have no jurisdiction over civil cases or minor crimes. (2) The 
jury caseload primarily consists of aggravated murder, racketeering, aggravated 
(or first degree) bribery, and crimes against justice (such as perjury or obstructing 
a police officer). (3) 
 
Russian juries try approximately 0.05% of all criminal cases and have a 20% 
acquittal rate, which is approximately twenty times higher than that of traditional 
courts. (4) Despite the miniscule share of criminal cases that they have tried, 
juries have gained some notoriety after several widely publicized acquittals. 
Juries have been criticized as unprofessional and susceptible to emotional and 
financial pressure by all parties in the criminal process. In one case, two affluent 
Russian businessmen, Igor Poddubny and Yevgeny Babkov, were charged with 
possessing $2 million worth of contraband cigarettes, fraud, money laundering, 
and conspiracy. The first jury was dismissed after the prosecution unsuccessfully 
attempted to pressure the jurors to reconsider their forthcoming “not guilty” 
verdict. Members of the second jury, after rendering a “not guilty” verdict, went to 
a restaurant to celebrate the verdict with one of the defendants, his lawyer, and 
some members of the first jury. The Supreme Court overturned the verdict, but 
the third jury issued an acquittal as well, setting the men free after five years of 
pretrial incarceration. (5) 
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“But who are the judges?” asked playwright Aleksandr Griboedov in 1823. Today, 
the answer is often “the unemployed, retirees, citizens that fail to disclose their 
criminal past, and persons prone to alcohol abuse.” Since only 16% of population 
is willing to participate in a jury, concern has been high that juries are being 
drawn from pools of citizens susceptible to manipulation and corruption. They 
may see jury duty as a way to supplement their incomes and are frequently 
indifferent to the interests of justice. Educated and employed citizens often 
perceive jury duty as an inadequately compensated waste of time and simply 
ignore the summons. (6) The absence of a jury sequestration procedure makes 
jurors yet more prone to corruption. (7) Since there is no unanimity of verdict 
requirement, it may be sufficient to bribe two or three jurors to influence the 
majority and ensure a desired verdict. (8) 
 
An additional problem contributing to a weak jury pool is that the voter lists from 
which jury candidates are selected frequently contain incorrect or fraudulent 
addresses, including those of deceased and fabricated persons. In 2003, when 
the Moscow Regional Court started assembling potential jury panels, only 60 of 
the 1200 candidates responded to the summons. (9) Furthermore, the existing 
procedures for enforcing jury attendance are highly ineffective and even judges 
prefer not to compel anyone to serve on a jury. 
 
The long legacy of Soviet oppression and public distrust of government can also 
lead jurors to side with defendants. (10)  In order to circumvent this and stay true 
to the state’s traditional “no acquittals” policy on fighting crime, judges often 
deliberately commit reversible errors in trials, so that prosecutors will have 
grounds for appeal if a jury is determined to acquit. Russia’s Supreme Court 
routinely has been reversing approximately half of all jury acquittals, as opposed 
to only 5-8% of jury convictions. (11) Opponents of jury trials cite these high rates 
as evidence of the juries’ purported unprofessionalism. However, further analysis 
of judicial statistics indicates that jury verdicts usually are overturned because of 
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the failure of the presiding judges to correctly put together verdict forms and/or 
due to the poor quality of the preliminary investigation. (12) Sometimes these 
oversights are intentional. “Jurors vote according to conscience, the absence of 
which is judges’ occupational disease,” comments prominent Russian lawyer 
Henri Reznik. (13) 
 
Prosecutors’ failure to adapt to the demands of the newly institutionalized jury 
system frequently exacerbates conflict with the old judicial mentality. Russia’s 
jury verdict form is a complex document, especially in cases involving multiple 
charges and/or defendants. Traditional prosecutors, who lack public speaking 
skills and the ability to explain intricate legal concepts to jurors, often receive 
ambiguous and contradictory answers that result in a subsequent judgment 
reversal. However, rather than acknowledge a shared responsibility for 
inconsistent or overturned verdicts, many legal professionals prefer to disparage 
jurors’ emotional susceptibility. (14) 
 
Nevertheless, jurors’ leniency has had some positive influence on criminal legal 
theory and practice. Legal experts and practitioners acknowledge that the 
preliminary investigations of criminal cases that later are forwarded to jury trials 
are carried out more thoroughly and with stricter observance of the law. (15) 
 
Currently, 30% of citizens trust juries over judges; 21% trust judges more; the 
rest either do not have a preference (30%) or consider both forms of judicial 
proceedings equally trustworthy (19%). Both supporters and opponents of the 
jury system are dissatisfied with its current performance. Supporters are 
disappointed that jury trials are becoming increasingly susceptible to 
manipulation and takeover by the traditional judicial apparatus and practices. 
Opponents are frustrated with the high acquittal rates and excessive 
unpredictability of the verdicts. (16) Nevertheless, the current legal framework for 
jury trials provides for a fairer trial that is in greater compliance with the law and 
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that helps bridge the gap between the judicial system and citizens, who gradually 
are getting used to the idea of acquittal as a legitimate outcome of a criminal trial. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Jury trials start functioning in the final region of RF, Chechnya,” RIA Novosti, 
31 Dec 09 via http://www.rian.ru/general_jurisdiction/20091231/202473956.html. 
(2) See The Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, Part XII, official 
text, ConsultantPlus, via 
http://www.consultant.ru/popular/upkrf/11_56.html#p4349. Last accessed 11 Jan 
10. 
(3) Oleg Muhin, “Juror, even if he is in doubt, must decide whether the defendant 
is guilty or not,” Izvestia.Ru, 22 Dec 09 via 
http://www.izvestia.ru/spb/article3136860. 
(4) “Judicial Statistics,” Website of the Judicial Department at the Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation, via http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=5&item=34. 
(5) Daria Okuneva, “Acquitting jurors,” Novye izvestiya, 11 May 06 via   
http://www.newizv.ru/news/2006-05-11/45958. 
(6) Maslovskaya E. V., “Jury trial in contemporary Russia: legal discourse and 
sociologic analysis,” Vestnik of N.I. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni 
Novgorod, 20 May 09 via 
http://www.unn.ru/pages/issues/vestnik/99999999_West_2009_4/39.pdf. 
(7) “Juror, even if he is in doubt,” Izvestia.Ru, Ibid. 
(8) “Acquitting jurors,” Novye izvestiya, Ibid. 
(9) Vladimir Perekrest, “People’s Femida,” Izvestiya, 2 July 03 via 
http://www.izvestia.ru/russia/article35615/index.html. 
(10) “Jury trial in contemporary Russia,” Vestnik of N.I. Lobachevsky State 
University of Nizhni Novgorod, Ibid. 
(11) “Judicial Statistics,” Website of the Judicial Department at the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation, Ibid. 
(12) “Jury trial in contemporary Russia,” Vestnik of N.I. Lobachevsky State 
University of Nizhni Novgorod, Ibid. 
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(13) Aleksandr Vasiliev, “The most humane court… Jurors, according to 
prosecutors, are too lenient,” Official Website of the Ombudsman of the Russian 
Federation, 16 Oct 06 via 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/dad_2006/dad10/dad430/06.doc. 
(14)  “Jury trial in contemporary Russia,” Vestnik of N.I. Lobachevsky State 
University of Nizhni Novgorod, Ibid. 
(15) Popova A. D., “Modern juror: who is he?” Sociologicheskie Issledovaniya, 
2004, #12, Russian Academy of Sciences via 
http://www.ecsocman.edu.ru/images/pubs/2006/06/16/0000279753/012.POPOV
A.pdf. 
(16) “Jury trial in contemporary Russia,” Vestnik of N.I. Lobachevsky State 
University of Nizhni Novgorod, Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Borders: Drones from Israel 
Three months ago, in mid-October 2009, the FSB announced plans to equip the 
elite Border Guards Service with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), systems 
that are ideal for the purpose of patrolling and maintaining surveillance of 
Russia’s lengthy border areas. ZALA Aero Pilotless Systems, a Russian 
company based in Izhevsk, was declared the contract winner, and was slated to 
supply the FSB with a mixture of fixed-wing and rotary drones. (1) 
 
In mid-January, several reports in the Russian press noted that the FSB had 
taken delivery of its UAVs from ZALA, (2) but indicated that there were problems. 
According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye oborzreniye, the drones are incapable of 
dealing with some of the extreme conditions that exist in the border zones. (3) As 
a result of ZALA’s problems, the FSB apparently has decided that the remainder 
of its requirements are to be furnished by a foreign company, the Israeli firm 
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Aeronautics Defense. The drone selected by the Lubyanka is the Orbiter, a 
lightweight medium altitude vehicle, small enough to be transported in a 
backpack and launched by catapult. (4) 
 
What is interesting about this story is that it has been simmering for some time, 
but has been publicized only now. In the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian war, the 
Defense Ministry and FSB apparently conducted joint tests of several Russian 
UAV systems, “not one” of which “accomplished the designed missions.” (5) This 
begs the question: was the decision initially to “buy Russian” a purely political 
one? If so, the decision has backfired, as the move to a foreign firm now clearly 
appears as an admission that Russia’s military industrial complex is so decrepit it 
cannot even meet the requirements of its own Security Services for 
technologically sophisticated equipment. If so, why has a foreign purchase 
suddenly become less embarrassing? It also bears asking—given the FSB’s 
refusal to comment on the “motives” (6) for negotiations with Israel—whether the 
decision to purchase from Israel, rather than any other arms trading nation, was 
driven by foreign policy considerations, specifically to some kind of quid pro quo 
on the Iranian issue. 
 
MVD: Nurgaliyev out, Stepashin in? 
Late in December 2009, President Dmitri Medvedev signed into law a Decree, 
“Measures To Improve The Performance by Russian Interior Authorities,” (7) 
ordering significant reforms to be made to the Interior Ministry. According to the 
Kremlin’s Press Service, the decision to make wide-ranging changes to law 
enforcement was the result of “a huge number of complaints” from “our citizens” 
regarding police practices. Law enforcement officials, Medvedev noted, must be 
“flawless morally,” and have “impeccable” positions, legally speaking. (8) The 
reforms at MVD are to take a number of forms. 
 
First, the Interior Ministry is to cut its personnel 20% by 1 January 2012. (9) 
Second, two departments of the Ministry must be closed by the same date. (10) 
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Third, serving officers from the Ministry’s “federal personnel reserve” are to be 
given “priority” rights to apply for and fill high ranking positions in the 
organization, (11) thereby theoretically increasing the pool of qualified applicants 
for such positions. Fourth, future decisions on dismissing officials of retirement 
age, or on those wishing to extend their tenure are to be made at the presidential 
level. (12) Fifth, funds saved via the 20% personnel cuts are to be used to 
increase, via incentivization, the salaries of the MVD’s remaining officers. (13) 
Sixth, the MVD is to refine its hiring procedures, increasing the emphasis on 
education, “moral-ethical qualities” and readiness to “serve the country and the 
citizens of Russia” during the selection process. “Extraneous” (read, unsuitable) 
individuals are to be weeded out via enhanced psychological screenings. (14) 
 
On 22 January, it emerged that a debate was carried out as far back as 
November 2009, as to which departments of the MVD are to be downsized. 
According to Vedomosti, the Presidium of the Russian Jurists Association (an 
organization apparently close to Medvedev) met late in November. The 
committee, co-chaired by Sergei Stepashin—who also serves as Comptroller—
proposed that the MVD should be divided into two organizations, the Federal 
Police and the Federal Militia, with a National Guard type organization taking on 
the Ministry’s Paramilitary duties. Vedomosti also claims that current MVD chief 
Nurgaliyev and Stepashin are to exchange jobs at some stage in the spring. (15) 
At the time of writing there is no confirmation that this is indeed the case – and 
any confirmation of modifications to the Interior Ministry’s leadership is unlikely to 
be publicized before the MVD’s annual collegium, slated for February 17-18 
2010. 
 
It is important to note in reference to the above changes, that although an overall 
reduction in departments has been mandated by decree, the MVD’s Special 
Purpose Units (OMON), used for riot or demonstration control, with many 
currently serving in Chechnya, and now numbering some 25,200 men in 98 
 11 
outposts around the country are not to be affected by cuts, and may even be 
increased in size. (16) 
 
It is legitimate to ask what effect the aforementioned reforms will have in reality. 
Stepashin is a hold-over from the Yel’tsin and Putin presidencies, and has 
previous experience as Interior Minister. As the FSB demonstrates, splitting an 
agency’s functions into multiple departments does not necessarily reduce its 
power and influence. A cynic might argue that real evidence must come to light 
before any of Russia’s law enforcement agencies can be described as having the 
“social prestige” (17) that those at the top desire. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, Number 5 Part 1 (12 Nov 09). 
(2) “Paper Says UAV Lag Risks Throwing Russia into “History’s Backyard,” 
Editorial: ‘Without a Pilot Upfront,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Jan 10; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(3) “Analysis of FSB’s Purchase of Israeli UAVs, Lack of Faith in RF Defense 
Industry, Unattributed Article On The Decision of The Federal Security Service of 
the Russian Federation to purchase Unmanned Flying Vehicles From Israel, 
rather than from enterprises of the Russian Defense-Industrial Complex. ‘A 
Warning from the Federal Security Service,’” Nezavisimoye voyennoye 
obozreniye, 16 Jan 10; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(4) “Russia: FSB Said to Negotiate Purchase of Israeli UAVs for Border 
Surveillance. Report by Ivan Konovalov and Mikhail Alekseyev: ‘FSB Overflying 
Russia. And It Can’t Manage Without Israeli Assistance, Apparently,’” 
Kommersant Online, 13 Jan 10; OSC Transcribed Via World News Connection.  
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Interior Ministry Reform To Start Soon-Nurgaliyev,” Interfax, 15 Jan 10; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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(8) “Medvedev Slashes Interior Ministry Budget,” RFE/RL, 24 Dec 09 via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Slashes_Interior_Ministry_Budget/191316
1.htm. 
9) “Russia: MVD Head Discusses Changes in Police Reporting Procedures—
Radio Interview With Army General Rashid Nurgaliyev, Russian Federation 
Minister of Internal Affairs, by Unnamed Anchor of the Program ‘Conversation 
with the Minister’ on the Militseyskaya Volna Radio Station on Wednesday 16 
Dec 09: ‘Conversation With the Minister’ on Radio Militseyskaya Volna,’” Ministry 
of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 26 Dec 09; OSC Translated Text via 
World News Connection. 
(10) “Russian Interior Minister Upbeat About President’s Decree on Reform,” 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 24 Dec 09; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Interior Ministry Reform To Start Soon-Nurgaliyev,” Interfax, 15 Jan 10; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(12) “Medvedev Orders Improvements to Interior Ministry Personnel Policy,” 
Interfax-AVN Online, 11 Jan 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) “Russian Internal Affairs Minister Nurgaliyev on Personnel Policy, Polygraph 
Use—Rashid Gumarovich Nurgaliyev, Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Answers Listeners Questions on Radio Program; ‘Personnel Issues. The 
Program Conversation with the Minister on the Air at the Radio Station 
Militseyskaya Volna,’” Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 13 
Jan 10; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(15) “Russian Interior Minister Said About To Be Replaced by Audit Chamber 
Head,” Vedomosti, 22 Jan 10; BBC Monitoring via World News Connection. 
(16) “Russia: More Riot Police Units Being Created to Control Civilians—
Website,” Yezhedenevnyy Zhurnal, 15 Dec 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) “Russia: MVD Head Nurgaliyev Discusses Changes in Police Reporting 
Procedures-Radio interview with Army General Rashid Nurgaliyev, Russian 
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Federation minister of internal affairs, by unnamed anchor of the program 
‘Conversation With the Minister" on the Militseyskaya Volna radio station on 
Wednesday, 16 Dec 09: Conversation With the Minister on Radio Militseyskaya 
Volna’", Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 26 Jan 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Defense industry grows, awaits modernization plan 
Overall, the Russian military-industrial complex made modest production gains in 
2009.  Prime Minister Putin praised the industry for their 3.7 percent growth last 
year, particularly when contrasted to an overall decline in Russia’s total industrial 
output. (1) The one sector that continues to make progress is the arms export 
sector.  However, despite modest gains, the military-industrial complex must 
undergo serious reform to meet the modernization needs of the Russian armed 
forces. 
 
Russian arms sales grew from $7 billion in 2008 (2) to $8.5 billion in 2009. (3)   In 
a recent interview, Mikhail Dmitriyev, Director of the Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation, lauded the industry’s consistent growth in output over the 
past ten years and predicted that the current economic crisis would not affect the 
military-industrial complex negatively. (4)  The head of Rosoboronexport, 
Anatoliy Isaykin, also expressed optimism for another successful year, indicating 
that the company had good prospects for new contracts in 2010. (5)  In fact, 
Russia may be close to inking two major deals in the first half of 2010.  The first 
is a $600 million agreement with Myanmar for the delivery of 20 MiG-29s. (6)  
The second could be a new weapons contract with Saudi Arabia worth over $4 
billion dollars. (7) 
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Although the arms industry experienced modest success in 2009, Prime Minister 
Putin cautioned, “there [are] a multitude of problems in the military-industrial 
complex.” (8)  Symptoms of the industry’s stress are evident in its finances.  At 
the end of 2009, Prime Minister Putin poured in 430 million rubles to rescue three 
companies from impending bankruptcy. (9)  For 2010, Putin is considering an 8 
percent increase in the state defense order. (10)  He already has allocated an 
additional 6.5 billion rubles to obtain controlling interests in Russia’s leading 
enterprises in helicopter construction and engine construction. (11) 
 
Additional symptoms of Russia’s defense industry’s woes include testing 
setbacks in the Bulava missile (12) and the Aist UAV. (13)  According to one 
Russian analyst, “Russia has forgotten how to do large-scale design projects, 
whether they [are] the GLONASS [Global Navigation Satellite System] project, 
the “Sukhoy Superjet” project, or the fifth generation fighter aircraft project.” (14)  
 
Finally, the industry is facing pressure from foreign military suppliers.  Endorsing 
foreign competition at the end of 2009, Prime Minister Putin stated, “Our defense 
[industry] should…realize when deciding on the final price that they have a 
competitor.” (15)  Not only does the industry need to become more cost effective, 
it also needs to start delivering more innovative military technology.  Prime 
Minister Putin highlighted, “the need for technological upgrades at our leading 
enterprises.” (16)  Defense Minister Serdyukov added that the armed forces 
would consider foreign military purchases in cases where Russia’s industry has 
lagged behind technologically. (17) 
 
So far, the evidence suggests that the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister 
are serious.  In 2009, Russia bought 12 Israeli UAVs for $53 million. (18) Russia 
may allocate another $3 million in 2010 to purchase five additional Israeli UAVs 
for the FSB. (19)  Russia also is considering whether to acquire a French 
helicopter carrier (approximately $1.4 billion) and may consider delaying 
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construction of the fourth Type 955 Borey-class submarine to help fund the 
purchase. (20)  
 
The Russian Defense Ministry is acutely aware of the industry’s challenges and 
the risk it poses to their capabilities.  Lt-Gen Frolov, the commander of the Main 
Directorate for Armaments of the Russian Defense Ministry, said the military-
industrial complex needs to make a “qualitative leap” ahead in developing new 
and innovative weapon systems. (21)  He went on to say that, “If we do not 
qualitatively renew our armaments in the near future, we will, of course, fall 
behind the best armies of the [world].” (22) 
 
During a year-end interview, Defense Minister Serdyukov stated that the military-
industrial complex is not ready, for the time being, to meet the long-term 
modernization goals of the armed forces. (23)  However, he did indicate that a 
draft modernization plan for the military-industrial complex would be completed 
by the end of the first quarter in 2010. (24)  As Russian leaders work to correct 
industry shortfalls over the long-term, the defense ministry plans on a 
“breakthrough” procurement year in 2010 and plans to purchase 30 ballistic 
missiles, 300 pieces of armored equipment, 30 helicopters, 28 combat aircraft, 3 
nuclear submarines, a corvette class ship, 5 Iskander missile systems, and 11 
satellites. (25) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Russian defence sector still facing problems, imports possible – Putin, 
Rossiya TV, 3 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) Russian state arms exporter expects annual sales of 7bn dollars for 2008, 
Interfax-AVN, 30 Dec 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Russia’s arms sales for 2009 over 8.5bn dollars – official, RIA Novosti, 22 
Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) Ibid. 
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(5) Russian arms exports unaffected by global crisis – head of arms exporting 
firm, Interfax, 21 Jan 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) Russia signs 600m dollars’ worth of arms contracts with Burma – source, 
Interfax-AVN, 23 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) Russia expects 4bn dollars worth of arms deals with Saudis shortly – source, 
Interfax-AVN, 11 Jan 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) Russian defence sector still facing problems, imports possible – Putin, 
Rossiya TV, 3 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) Russia’s Putin allocates R430m in subsidies to defence enterprises, RIA 
Novosti, 7 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(10) Russian state defence order may rise by 8 per cent in 2010 – Putin, Interfax, 
22 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(11) Putin gives Russian defence industry another R6.5bn, 23 Dec 09, RIA 
Novosti via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(12) Test sequence for Russia’s troubled Bulava ICBM may be revised – industry 
source, RIA Novosti, 12 Jan 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(13) New Russian drone said to have exploded during tests, Interfax-AVN, 19 
Jan 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(14) Russian analysts blame Bulava failures on inability to coordinate large 
projects, Gazeta, 15 Jan 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(15) Russian defence sector still facing problems, imports possible – Putin, 
Rossiya TV, 3 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Russian defence minister discusses military reform, has faith in Bulava 
missile, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 27 Dec 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(18) Russian draft military doctrine proposes restricting purchases of foreign 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Trilateral customs union – new post-Soviet trade bloc? 
The second decade of the new millennium began with the appearance of yet 
another new transnational entity on the post-Soviet scene. Effective January 1, 
2010, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are joined together by a Customs Union, 
the main features of which were agreed upon and signed at a November 27 
summit of the three countries’ presidents, Medvedev, Lukashenka and 
Nazarbayev, in the Belarusian capital Minsk. 
 
In theory, the Customs Union is the beginning of a major economic integration 
project which, if implemented according to plan, is to result in the emergence of a 
single economic space in the post-Soviet arena akin to the European Union. 
Already, the architects of the project have announced an ambitious timeline for 
its implementation. In the first phase, already in effect as of January 1, the 
participating members are supposed to start using a single customs tariff. In the 
second phase, starting in July 2010, customs controls are to be physically 
removed from border crossings between the countries, resulting in the creation of 
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a common customs space. Finally, by 2012 the three countries  are to be joined 
in a common economic space. 
 
The implementation of the customs union was greeted with immense enthusiasm 
in a wide variety of government circles. All three presidents heralded it as the 
beginning of a new era in economic relations in the region – the first steps in the 
path to the emergence of a new economic zone. Some went further: Secretary of 
the Union State of Belarus and Russia Pavel Borodin predicted that the new 
union would result in the emergence of a new USSR by the centennial 
anniversary of its predecessor: “I give you journalists a directive to write that 
Soviet space will be restored in 2017,”  declared Borodin at a press-conference 
in Minsk on December 21, 2009. (1) For his part, Russian First Vice Premier Igor 
Shuvalov tried to reassure the international community that this was not the case. 
Speaking at the international conference titled “Russia and Global World: New 
Decade Challenges” in Moscow on January 21, Shuvalov stated that “this project 
has nothing to do with the project of the Soviet Union, this is a modern integration 
project.” (2)  Be that as it may, just four days into the union's existence, Speaker 
of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, extended an invitation to the remaining 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the new entity. 
"Nevertheless, already today we can see much interest in our association from 
some CIS states. Their entry into the Customs Union, of course as soon as they 
are ready, is a process that we can only welcome," said Gryzlov on January 4 (3) 
So far, such interest appears to have been expressed only by the Central Asian 
states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, according to the regional informational 
website EurasiaNet.org. (4) While Borodin's prediction that “we'll take Georgia 
and Ukraine into the union” (5) has not been shared by others, it does appear 
that at least among those members of the CIS that already are associated 
closely with Russia, there may be the possibility of future expansion of the zone, 
assuming that the initial phase goes according to plan. 
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In order to administer the Customs Union, a new committee has been created, 
chaired by State Duma Deputy Sergei Glaziev. The selection of Glaziev to 
oversee the implementation of a new post-Soviet economic zone is an interesting 
one, given his background. An economist by training, Glaziev had been an early 
critic of the economic liberalization policies of the Yel’tsin administration and an 
advocate for a state-regulated market and trade policies favoring the Russian 
producer over international competitors. Politically, Glaziev belongs to the 
“patriotic” camp, and for a short time he was head of the Rodina (“Motherland”) 
party and intended to run as the party's nominee against Vladimir Putin in the 
2004 presidential elections. During an interview with Igor Panarin, host of the 
Moscow radio program “Mirovaya Politika” (“World Politics”), Glaziev discussed 
some of the details of the customs union and offered some of his predictions for 
its future. In terms of the decision-making procedure of the customs union 
committee, he stated that in the event of a disagreement among members of the 
customs union committee on a major issue, a two-thirds majority would be 
required to pass or repeal a new measure. Since 58% of the committee members 
are from Russia, this mechanism effectively would prevent Russia from being 
able to impose its will unilaterally on the other members of the Union, says 
Glaziev. (6) Citing reports from economic experts at the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Glaziev optimistically predicted total growth of up to 15% of the 
member states’ collective GDP due to the elimination of costs attributed to 
existing trade barriers. (7) A long-time proponent of the expansion of Russian 
business in the “near abroad” and former deputy secretary of the Eurasian 
Economic Council, Glaziev seems to have high hopes for the customs union and, 
having been thwarted in his larger political ambitions, may now channel his 
energy into the customs union as a pet project.  
 
The declaration of the customs union, and the implementation of the unified tariff 
as the first phase in its development, coincides with the latest in a series of 
Russo-Belarusian “energy wars.” One has to wonder about the long-term 
prospects of a project whose stated goal is the creation of a barrier-free trade 
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zone when, at its very inception, two of the three members are engaged in a 
trade war with one another. Specifically, the latest oil standoff highlights a point 
of contention in the implementation of the customs union that is unlikely to be 
resolved any time soon, namely the reconciliation of Russia's current oil and gas 
export policies with the stated goals of the customs union. Already, Russia's 
position is that the oil trade is not to be included in the terms of the Union tariff 
agreement – in other words, the elimination of the tariff between members of the 
customs union will not apply to the export duty on Russian oil. This stance on the 
part of Russia has caused the Belarusians to wonder out loud whether the whole 
thing was even worth it. Thus, shortly after New Year's Day, one Belarusian 
official commented publicly that excluding groups of products from the tariff 
agreements within the framework of the customs union, as Russia was doing, 
made it pointless for Belarus to join the union. (8) This sentiment was preceded 
by Lukashenka’s comments in November expressing doubts about the benefits 
of Belarus joining the customs union, just several days before the November 27 
signing of the principal documents creating the union. (9) In Kazakhstan, too, 
members of Nazarbaev's administration grumbled privately that the customs 
union would benefit Russian and Belarusian producers at the expense of Kazakh 
ones. (10)  Given these reservations, the creation of the union in and of itself can 
be touted by the Medvedev administration as a diplomatic success for 2009. 
 
It remains to be seen, however, what effect the new customs union will have on 
the evolution of Russian foreign policy both in the post-Soviet sphere and the rest 
of the world. Undoubtedly, this project is one in a series of Russian efforts to 
expand its influence in the countries of the former USSR. According to union 
committee head Glaziev, one of the project’s more long-term goals is the 
establishment of a single currency throughout the union – based, unsurprisingly, 
on the ruble. (11) Given the obvious contradictions between Russia's current 
energy policy and the very idea of tariff-free trade, however, the vision of a post-
Soviet economic free trade zone appears a dim prospect. In the immediate 
future, the emergence of the customs union raises issues concerning Russia's 
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potential entry into the WTO. As early as June 2009, when the customs union 
project was in its embryonic stages, WTO officials foresaw difficulties in Russia's 
membership process as a result of the union initiative. (12) In response to these 
potential difficulties, Medvedev stated that the members of the new union may 
pursue entry into the WTO either as a single entity, or separately, but only after 
having first agreed upon a unified tariff. (13) Yet herein may lie one of the less 
obvious, but important, mechanisms for Russia to exercise regional hegemony 
through the new customs union. The terms of the customs union effectively 
prevent a member from seeking bilateral trade relations with an external entity, 
since any tariff policy must be first approved within the customs union. Since 
approximately 92% of the union's tariff policies are to be based on existing 
Russian duties, (14) it is primarily the other members that must adjust their tariffs 
in order to comply with the standards of the customs union. In effect, the customs 
union can be viewed as an imposition of the Russian tariff regime onto two of its 
neighboring states. The union also will make it more difficult for Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, or any other countries that may join, to enter into trade agreements 
with other entities, again increasing their dependence on Russia. Finally, an 
economic union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan may be used by the regimes 
in all three countries as a defense mechanism against real or perceived threats 
to their monopoly on power.  A lot of unknowns exist, but one thing that makes 
the results of the customs union project relatively easy to assess is the specific 
timetable that its organizers have publicly announced. Thus, by July of this year, 
it will at least be known whether the next stated goal of the project—the 
elimination of customs controls—will have been completed. In general, what 
happens during the next year in terms of relations among these countries 
probably will determine the overall failure or success of the customs union and its 
eventual goal of post-Soviet economic integration. 
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